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1Introduction
Agriculture has long been overshadowed by energy-related issues in the policy and scientiﬁc debate
surrounding climate change. In many respects though, agriculture plays a key-role in this issue: (i) agri-
cultural activities contribute signiﬁcantly to global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG); (ii) agricul-
ture is the major emitting sector for methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) – the two main non-CO2
GHGs included in the “Kyoto basket”; (iii) the impacts of climate change as predicted by climate
models are expected to be stronger on agriculture1 than on other sectors.
If mitigation policies are only focused on energy- or transport-related CO2 emissions, the cost of
achieving any given abatement is likely to be unnecessarily high (Reilly et al., 1999; Hayhoe et al., 1999;
Burniaux, 2000; Manne and Richels, 2001). There is thus a need for the EU to ﬁnd alternative potential
abatements in other sectors to comply with its 8%-reduction Kyoto commitment. As agriculture may
oﬀer such additional reductions, this sector has drawn increasing attention from the policymakers in
the recent years (Bates, 2001; European Commission, 1998a; European Commission, 1998b; European
Commission, 2002).
Emissions from EU agriculture total about 405 MtCO2eq or 10% of total European emissions2 and
involve both crop and livestock production activities. Nitrous oxide emissions represent approximately
210 MtCO2eq, while methane accounts for about 195 MtCO2eq. GHG emissions from agriculture result
from nitrogen application to agricultural soils (N2O), manure management (CH4 and N2O), enteric
fermentation in livestock production (CH4) and rice cultivation (CH4). A key-issue in examining the
role of agriculture in GHG emissions consists in assessing the abatement costs in this sector. The
magnitude of abatement costs in agriculture relatively to other sectors determines both the social
beneﬁt and the eﬀective reduction that can be expected from the implementation of a mitigation
policy in this sector.
In the recent empirical literature about GHG emissions from agriculture, abatement cost curves
have been estimated at various scales and using diﬀerent modeling techniques. De Cara and Jayet
(2000) have assessed the abatement costs in French agriculture. In addition to N2O emissions from
the use of synthetic fertilizers and CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation, the authors account for
1The impacts of climate change on agriculture are not however necessarily expected to be negative for all production
activities. The change in average temperatures may actually have both positive and negative impacts on yields. One
has also to account for the impacts on the spatial distribution of crops as a consequence of climate change. Nevertheless,
many aspects of climate change, such as the increase of extreme events occurrence and the spread of pests for instance,
may aﬀect negatively yields and farmers’ revenues.
2Based on 2001 emissions of methane and nitrous oxide from agricultural soils, manure management, enteric fer-
mentation, and rice cultivation, as reported by the EU in its 2003 communication to the UNFCCC (available at
http://unfccc.int/program/mis/ghg/submis2003.html). Emissions of methane and nitrous oxide are converted into
CO2 by using the 2001 Global Warming Potentials (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001a).
2the possibility of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and explore the conversion of set-aside
land into forests. Abatement costs estimates are also available in the literature at smaller (regional)
scales from experimental farms (Meyer-Aurisch and Tr¨ uggelmann, 2002) or farm models (Angenendt
et al., 2000). McCarl and Schneider (2001) published a comprehensive assessment of GHG abatement
costs in US agriculture. Their approach includes CH4 and N2O emissions as well as CO2 emissions
resulting from fossil fuel use in agriculture and carbon sequestration in soils and above-ground biomass.
One interesting feature of this work lies in the assessment of the impacts of alternative agricultural
practices and/or production activities (e.g. reduced- or no- tillage practices, energy crops, etc...) on
net emissions and abatement costs (see also Schneider and McCarl (2003)). As for the EU, marginal
abatement cost curves have been estimated on a country basis by De Cara and Jayet (2001) and Perez
et al. (2003).
The present paper departs from the previous literature mainly because of the focus on the hetero-
geneity of abatement costs within the EU and on the implications of this heterogeneity for the design
of a mitigation policy. Abatement cost heterogeneity is indeed crucial for both economic and policy
purposes. The heterogeneity of abatement costs is a fundamental determinant in the optimal choice of
a mitigation policy instrument. Acknowledgedly, incentive-based instruments are generally viewed –at
least under perfect information– as more eﬃcient than command-and-control regulations and uniform
standards. Incentive-based instruments tend to equalize marginal abatement costs across polluting
agents and consequently minimize the total abatement cost. In contrast, uniform standards generally
result in distorted allocations of the total abatement. Nevertheless, information and control costs can
jeopardize the implementation of optimal instruments in practice, more particularly if spatial hetero-
geneity is large. There is thus a trade-oﬀ between control costs of implementing optimal instruments
on the one hand, and the eﬃciency loss due to distorted abatement allocation on the other hand (see
for instance Antle et al. (2003) for an application to the design of carbon sequestration contracts).
Newell and Stavins (2003) analytically investigate the savings of incentive-based instruments relative
to uniform standards. As expected, these savings are shown to increase with respect to the variance
of marginal abatement costs3. Furthermore, in practice policymakers attach at least as much impor-
tance to the spatial distribution of economic and environmental impacts of a mitigation policy as to
the magnitude of these impacts. Spatial analyzes that go beyond EU- or country-wide estimates of
abatement costs curves are hence needed. The interest of such a spatial approach is strengthened
3The fact that the potential savings permitted by market-based instruments depend on the distribution of abatement
costs makes intuitive sense. It is clear that in a (hypothetical) static setting whereby all agents are homogeneous with
respect to abatement costs, market-based instruments do not do better than uniform standards. As the heterogeneity of
abatement costs –approximated by the variance of abatement-cost parameters– increases, the distortions in abatement
allocation under a uniform standard also increases.
3by the close interactions between GHG mitigation policies and other local environmental or policy
concerns.
Three major sources of abatement cost heterogeneity can be distinguished: (i) farm-size related
parameters (activity-data heterogeneity); (ii) per-unit of input or output emissions (emission-factor
heterogeneity); (iii) the ﬂexibility in the substitutions between production activities. Only the ﬁrst
two sources are analyzed in the stylized framework developed by Newell and Stavins. The ﬁrst source
is related to parameters such as the area allocated to each crop, crop production, animal numbers,
fertilizer use, etc. The second arises from the variability of climate and soil characteristics, input
productivity, management systems and agricultural practices (see for instance Freibauer (2003) for a
spatial analysis of emission-factor heterogeneity). The third source is often overlooked in the assess-
ment of abatement costs and depends on the possibilities of substituting emission-intensive processes
with environmental-friendlier productions and/or practices in the short run (Schneider, 2002). In this
paper, we account –yet to diﬀerent degrees– for these three sources of heterogeneity. Our discussion of
the heterogeneity of abatement costs is focused on regional rather than on farming-system dimensions,
although both aspects can be examined in the light of our results.
The objectives of this paper are threefold: (i) assessing the abatement costs in agriculture account-
ing for a wide range of sources and the diversity of farming systems in the EU; (ii) discussing the spatial
heterogeneity of abatement costs; (iii) estimating the eﬃciency loss caused by uniform standards as
compared to incentive-based instruments and highlighting the link with abatement cost heterogeneity.
For a range of CO2 prices, we assess the potential abatement resulting from an IPCC-based emission
tax in EU agriculture, as well as the optimal mix of emission sources in the total abatement. Further,
we show that the spatial variability of the abatement actually achieved at a given carbon price is
large, indicating that abatement cost heterogeneity is a fundamental feature. As a direct consequence,
uniform standards would result in abatement costs signiﬁcantly higher than with an emission tax.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, after a brief description of the model, we present the
diﬀerent GHG sources and the IPCC methodology used in the computation of agricultural emissions.
We also discuss in this section the interests and limits of this methodology. In section 2, we examine
the results in terms of baseline emissions and optimal abatement supply for an emission tax ranging
from 0 to 100 EUR/tCO2eq. We also analyze the relative weight of each source in the total abatement.
Spatial heterogeneity of abatement costs and its implications for mitigation policies are discussed in
section 3. In particular, we explore the inter- and infra-regional variability of optimal abatements at
given carbon prices and estimate the additional cost associated with uniform standards.
41 Analytical framework
1.1 The model
The generic model is based on mixed integer and linear programming methods. The primary source
of data is the 1997 Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN). This database provides accounting data
(revenues, variable costs, prices, yields, crop area, animal numbers, support received, farming system)
for a sample of farmers representing more than 2.5 millions of European (full-time) farmers. Data are
available at a regional level (101 regions in the EU-15). Each individual in the sample is associated
with a weight indicating its representativity in the regional population. Within each of the FADN
regions, the sample is divided into homogeneous farm types with respect to farming system, yields,
total area, animal numbers, and average altitude.
We thus obtain 734 farm types, each being associated with a speciﬁc model. Each model describes
the annual supply choices for a given farm type. The farm-type representation allows for the accounting
of the wide diversity of technical constraints faced by European farmers. Each farm type is viewed as
a single ﬁrm representative of the whole group behavior. Each producer (denoted by k) is assumed to
choose his/her supply level and input demand (xk) in order to maximize his/her total gross margin







xk πk(xk) ≡ gk · xk
s.t. Ak(θk,φ).xk ≤ zk(θk,φ) Ak ∈ Rm×n (C1)
xk ≥ 0 xk ∈ Rn (C2)
This problem is linear with respect to xk, the vector of the n endogenous variables. xk includes
the area in each crop, the size of the herd for each animal category, and the quantity of purchased
animal feeding. The n × 1-vector gk contains the gross margin associated to each producing activity
(prices plus support received minus variable costs). Thirty-two crop producing activities are allowed
in the model and represent most of the European agricultural land use, including the CAP set-aside
requirements. Farmers can sell their own crop production at the market price or use it for animal
feeding (feed grains, forage, pastures). In the latter case, only the variable cost appears in gk. With
respect to animal feeding, farmers can also endogenously choose to purchase feedstuﬀs (four types of
concentrates and one type of forage). As for livestock, thirty-one animal categories are represented
in the model (27 for cattle plus sheep, goats, swine and poultry). The matrix Ak and the vector zk
contain the input-output coeﬃcients and the right-hand side of the m constraints, respectively. The
vector of parameters θk characterizes the k-th type of producer and φ stands for the vector of general
economic parameters not dependent on type k. The constraints can be divided into ﬁve types: (i) crop
area allocation; (ii) livestock feed requirements; (iii) initial endowments of quasi-ﬁxed factors (land
5and livestock); (iv) cattle livestock demography; (v) restrictions imposed by the CAP measures. A
numerical algorithm based on Monte-Carlo and gradient methods is used to calibrate parameters in θk
for which data is not available. This calibration procedure is based on the 1997 FADN database and
relies on the minimization of the gaps between observed and simulated levels of endogenous variables
(xk) at the farm-type level.
1.2 GHG emissions from agriculture
The emission accounting method used in this paper follows the approach exposed in Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2001b). This methodology combines the use of country-speciﬁc activity data
–such as animal numbers, crop area, fertilizer use, manure management systems, etc.– and emission
factors. All EU Member States, as signatories of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), have committed themselves to report annually their GHG emissions accordingly.
In addition to this commitment, countries have to conduct quality and uncertainty assessment of the
data they report and to ensure time consistency of their inventories over the reported years from 1990
on.4 The IPCC method thus provides a common reporting framework that allows for completeness
and consistency. It therefore eases emission comparisons at the country level.
Agricultural activities contribute directly to GHG emissions through ﬁve main diﬀerent gas-emitting
processes (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001b): N2O emissions from agricultural soils;
N2O emissions from manure management; CH4 emissions from manure management; CH4 emissions
from enteric fermentation in domestic livestock; CH4 emissions from rice cultivation.5 Generally
speaking, the IPCC computation of GHG emissions relies on linear relationships between emissions
and activity data through the use of emission factors for each of the L (l = {1,...,L} sources of
emissions. Total emissions are thus deﬁned as the scalar product of the L × 1-vector of the emission
factors (EF) and the 1 × L-vector of the relevant activity data (x):




A detailed description of the components of EF can be found in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (2001b) and is summarized in appendix A.
4A certain degree of freedom is nevertheless left to countries in the choice of country-speciﬁc emission factors and/or
methods. But this degree of freedom comes with the obligation to document these choices with scientiﬁcally-sound
studies.
5Other sources of GHG emissions from agriculture are: emissions from burning of savannas and agricultural residues,
N2O emissions from sewage sludge application and from cultivation of organic soils, CO2 and CH4 emissions from
agricultural soils. These sources are of relatively minor importance to European agriculture. In this paper, we thus focus
on the ﬁve sources of emissions described above.
6In the model, the emissions for each farm type are derived from the IPCC relationships as de-
scribed in (1). We link each emission source to the levels of the relevant endogenous variables in the
model. Equations (5)-(11) (see appendix A) describe in details the computation of the emission fac-
tors. Country-speciﬁc emission factors and other information are used whenever provided in the 2003
national communications to the UNFCCC6. If this information was not available at the country-level,
the default IPCC values were used (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001b).
A total of twenty-one emission sources are computed within the model and are listed in table 2
(see appendix). Emissions of nitrous oxide are divided into eight sub-sources (four for agricultural soil
direct emissions, two for indirect agricultural soil indirect emissions, one for emissions from grazing
animals, and one for manure management). Emissions of methane are disaggregated into thirteen
sub-sources (manure management and enteric fermentation, which are both disaggregated into six
animal categories, and rice cultivation). This level of disaggregation allows a greater level of detail in
the comparisons with the GHG inventories as reported in the national communications. All emission
factors are converted into CO2 equivalent by using the 2001 Global Warming Potentials (GWP, 23 for
methane and 296 for nitrous oxide).
Crop-area driven emissions
With the exception of manure-related emissions, N2O emissions from agricultural soils are linked to
the area planted in each crop (endogenously computed in the model). Total fertilizer expenditures
are provided by the FADN database for each farmer in the sample. The estimate of per-hectare
fertilizer expenditure for each crop and each farm type is derived from simple covariance analysis. A
representative composite fertilizer is assumed for each crop and each country. Fertilizer prices paid
by farmers and nitrogen content were taken from the FAOSTAT and Eurostat fertilizer databases
(year 1997). We thus obtain the per-hectare nitrogen amount applied to each crop for each farm
type. The emission factors, and the volatilization and leaching parameters are taken from the national
communications of each Member State. As for biological ﬁxation and nitrogen in crop residues, we
use the values (nitrogen content, crop/residue ratio, dry matter fraction,...) as given in the national
communications or the default IPCC values, depending on availability. Crop yields are taken from
the FADN database. Our approach thus relies on constant per-hectare nitrogen inputs for each crop.
Consequently, each farmer has to shift land between crops according to their nitrogen requirement in
order to reduce N2O emissions.
6An overview of the methods and emission factors used in 2003 national communications can be found at http:
//unfccc.int/program/mis/ghg/sai2003.pdf. The detailed tables that have been used in the computation of emission
factors can be obtained upon request from the authors.
7Animal-feeding driven emissions
Methane emissions from both enteric fermentation and manure management depend on the energy
content of the feed intake for each animal category. To approximate the feed energy intake by each
animal category, the method proposed in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001b) relies
basically on the fulﬁllment of average energy requirements for each animal category.
As we seek to capture how changes in animal feeding impact emissions, we need to make these
emissions responsive to the farmers’ choices in terms of animal feeding, which are endogenously com-
puted within the model. To feed their animals, farmers can use their own crop and forage production,
or purchase concentrates (4 types) or forage. Three constraints play a key-role in these decisions.
Farmers have to meet the minimal digestible protein and energy needs of each animal category. In
addition, each animal is associated with a maximal quantity of ingested matter. The characteristics of
feedstuﬀs with respect to energy and protein content, dry matter fraction and digestibility, as well as
the energy/protein requirements and maximal quantity of ingested matter for each animal categories
have been taken from Jarrige (1988).
Animal-number driven emissions
N2O emissions from manure management depend on the average nitrogen content of manure. Hence,
they directly depend on animal numbers. The nitrogen excretion rates for each animal category have
been taken from the national communications or the IPCC. Because of the lack of available data at a
regional level, the average percentage of manure handled under each management system is also taken
from the national communications. The country-average is applied to each farm type. In addition,
some cattle categories are only allowed to vary in a limited range in the model (quasi-ﬁxed capital
assumption). In the subsequent simulations, this range represents ±15% of the initial animal numbers
in the corresponding animal categories.
1.3 IPCC emission accounting method: Discussion
Emissions that fall under the category “Agriculture” in the IPCC classiﬁcation only represent the
emissions that are directly linked to agricultural activities. This category does not include the emissions
caused by the production of inputs and capital goods and the transport of food and feed products.
Nor does it include the emissions caused by the use of fossil fuel in agriculture (accounted for in the
IPCC energy use category). Further, in accordance with international agreements on climate change,
non-anthropogenic sources –e.g. N2O background emissions by agricultural soils– are ignored. The
8emission coverage of the “Agriculture” category in the IPCC inventories, albeit very detailed for the
sources accounted for, is thus rather restrictive.7
Another important caveat about the IPCC coverage concerns carbon sequestration. Carbon seques-
tration in agricultural soils and above-ground biomass is not accounted for under the “Agriculture”
category but reported under “LULUCF” (Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry). Carbon sinks
in agricultural soils and above-ground biomass have been advocated by land-rich countries as a way to
provide cheap and large additional GHG abatements. Since the inclusion of carbon sinks in the Kyoto
Protocol, this issue has led to a number of controversies about how to account for carbon sequestration
in emission inventories (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2000) and its actual role as a
solution to tackle global warming (Schlesinger, 2000; Lal and Bruce, 1999). Actually, accounting for
carbon sequestration raises issues mainly because of the short-run and non-permanent nature of abate-
ments achieved this way (Arrouays et al., 2002; Feng et al., 2002). For instance, in-soil sequestered
carbon can be released back into the atmosphere as a result of changing practices (e.g. by switching
from no to conventional tillage). These features go beyond the scope of the present paper as they
require a dynamic approach. In the rest of the paper, we thus do not account for carbon sequestration
from agricultural activities. This aspect is nevertheless important to keep in mind when interpreting
the abatement costs estimates.
The IPCC methodology summarized above is not the only available method for emissions account-
ing. For instance, emission estimates can be derived from biophysical models such as EPIC (McCarl
and Schneider, 2001) or rely on more detailed regional-speciﬁc relationships (Freibauer, 2003). Ar-
guably, these alternative accounting approaches may provide more accurate emission estimates. In
fact, Freibauer (2003) questions the IPCC approach capability to ﬁt speciﬁc agricultural conditions of
production that prevail in a given region because of its use on emission factors averaged over a wide
range of situations. Freibauer argues that IPCC emission factors are consequently associated with
high magnitudes of uncertainty and hide important sources of spatial variability.
Conceivably, providing consistent and comparable GHG inventories methods for a large number of
countries necessarily requires a stylized representation of complex biological processes. Notwithstand-
ing at least three arguments support the use of the IPCC method in the present paper. First, by
using country-speciﬁc emission factors as reported in the national communications, some of the (inter-
7Deﬁning the coverage of emissions that should be taken into account within the model is not as straightforward
as it seems at ﬁrst glance. Let us consider for instance emissions resulting from the production of fertilizers. These
emissions can relatively easily be derived from the use of fertilizers in agriculture. One may rightfully view the reporting
of this information as valuable for inventory purposes. The problem arises however when assessing the abatement costs
and the impacts of a mitigation policy. Including these emissions in the computation of abatement costs implies strong
assumptions about the market structure and price transmission between the fertilizer industry and the farmers. In the
present paper, we thus limit ourselves to the emission coverage proposed by the IPCC for agriculture.
9country) variability of the emission factors is captured. Second, as countries have to report annually
their emissions according to this framework, we can use the national communications as consistent,
comprehensive and somewhat reliable sources in country-level comparisons. Third, from a practical
point of view, IPCC ﬁgures are the reference in verifying the compliance with international commit-
ments. So, regardless of the actual accuracy of the IPCC inventories, this method is per se relevant
as it reﬂects the actual eﬀort that has to be made to meet the reduction targets set by international
agreements.
2 Marginal abatement costs and EU abatement supply
2.1 Initial GHG emissions from agriculture in the EU
In order to check the ability of the model to predict emission levels, we ﬁrst run two preliminary
scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario corresponds to the Common Agricultural Policy as of 1997 (“CAP97”).
It thus pertains to the base year of the FADN database. The second scenario includes changes
related to the CAP that prevailed in 2001 (“Agenda 2000”). Notably, it includes the changes in
intervention prices, per-hectare support to grains and oilseeds, and the changes in milk quotas and
livestock subsidies that have occured between 1997 and 2001. Both scenarios are based on the same
initial dataset otherwise. In other words, the structure (number of farms, total available area, etc...) is
kept constant in the two scenarios. Hence, the diﬀerences in emissions between“CAP97”and“Agenda
2000” only arise from the diﬀerences in the CAP parameters.
Figure 1 compares the baseline emissions as computed by the model and the emissions reported to
the UNFCCC by each of the ﬁfteen Member States. Results have been aggregated on a country-basis
as information on emissions is available only at this level of details in the national communications. For
each Member State, the ﬁrst two bars represent the emissions as reported in the 2003 communication
for the years 1997 and 2001. The next two bars represent our emission estimates for the“CAP97”and
“Agenda 2000” scenarios, respectively.
<Figure 1 about here>
The model captures approximately 85% of the total EU emissions from agriculture. This partly
reﬂects the representativity of the FADN database. Emissions estimates are the most accurate for
N2O from agricultural soils (93%) and for CH4 from enteric fermentation (84%). The model captures
only 60-70% of the remaining emissions, which represent about 18% of the 2001 total emissions. The
relative changes between the two scenarios are relatively well captured by the model.
Yet the performances of the model vary from one country to another. Generally speaking, we
10slightly under-estimate emissions mainly because of N2O and CH4 manure-related emissions. For
some countries however –such as the UK or the Netherlands– initial emissions are over-estimated.
These diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerences in the FADN representativity sample across Member
States. They can also arise from diﬀerent choices in the implementation of the IPCC methodology.8
2.2 Abatement supply and marginal abatement cost curves
We then introduce in the model an emission tax t. The tax is assumed to aﬀect directly each farmer’s
revenue according to the total amount of CO2-equivalent emissions. The objective function of the
maximization program (Pk
1 ) is modiﬁed accordingly to include the total tax amount paid by each
farmer with respect to his/her emissions coming from all sources (t.ek). The simulations presented
hereafter are otherwise based on the “Agenda 2000” scenario.
By construction for a given emission tax t, emissions (ek∗(t)) are such that the marginal loss of
income due to an additional reduction equals t at the individual optimum for any k. By letting t
vary in a given range, we depict the optimal abatement supply curve or, equivalently, the marginal
abatement cost curves.Figure 2 shows the aggregate abatement supply for an emission tax varying
from 0 to 100 EUR/tCO2 by steps of 2.5 EUR.
We ﬁrst focus on the aggregate results (see 2). For instance, an abatement target of 27.5 MtCO2
implies a marginal abatement cost slightly higher than 55 EUR. This target represents 8% of the
“Agenda 2000” emissions as computed by the model. As indicated in the 2003 EU communication
to the UNFCCC, agricultural emissions are 7.4% lower in 2001 than in 1990 (see ﬁgure 3). If the
same rate of change is applied to the computed “Agenda 2000” emissions, the 27.5 MtCO2 target
corresponds to a 14.8%-reduction in emissions compared to the 1990 levels. With respect to the
Kyoto commitment –whereby the 2008/12 total emissions have to be 8% lower than in 1990–, it thus
represents a signiﬁcant mitigation eﬀort for agriculture.
<Figure 2 about here>
European Climate Change Programme (2003) has retained a carbon price of 20 EUR/tCO2eq as
the cost-eﬀectiveness threshold in its assessment of mitigation strategies. At this price, our results
indicate that GHG emissions from EU agriculture could be 4% lower than in 2001, or 11% lower than
in 1990 (same assumption as above). The upper limit of the simulation range (100 EUR) is associated
with an aggregate abatement of 40.5 MtCO2 eq (nearly a 12%-reduction as compared to“Agenda 2000”
emissions, and 18.3% compared to 1990 levels). Consistently with the LP nature of the model and
8Indeed, countries can use in their national communications simpliﬁed methods in their reporting of emissions (usually
referred to as “Tier 1a methods”) for sources of minor importances. Aggregation of these diﬀerences can lead to the
magnitude of the gaps observed in ﬁgure 1.
11the economic intuition, the total abatement supply is concave –implying convex marginal abatement
costs.
<Figure 3 about here>
Some caveats are worth being mentioned when comparing our estimates of abatement costs with
carbon prices published in the literature (see for instance Viguier et al. (2003)). Firstly, one has to
remember that the modeled set of abatement options is limited in our analysis. For instance, carbon
sequestration –which is not accounted for in this paper– might lower considerably the cost at which a
given level of reduction in net emissions can be reached. Secondly, structural rigidities in the model
–such as the constant number of farms, constant total land area, ﬁxed manure management systems–
tend to increase abatement costs. Altogether, our estimates can be thought as an upper limit of
abatement costs that can be expected in agriculture. However and despite these caveats, our results
indicate that agriculture could play a fair role in the fulﬁllment of with the Kyoto requirement. A
recent report by the European Commission (2003) suggests that –even with the implementation of
additional policies and measures– the total EU abatement is projected to fall short by 0.8% of the
Kyoto target in 2010. Additional abatements from agriculture can therefore contribute to bridge such
a gap.
The relative importance of the diﬀerent sources in the total abatement gives an indication of
the relative abatement costs associated to each source. Whereas methane emissions from enteric
fermentation represents 34% of the 2001 emissions, this category represents most of the abatement for
the lower values of the emission tax. This suggests lower abatement costs for this category relative to
other emission sources. Abatements of methane emissions are primarily obtained through changes in
animal feeding for the lower values of t. Comparatively, N2O emissions from agricultural soils (52% of
the initial emissions) are underrepresented in total abatements for the lower tax levels. However, as
the tax increases and substitutions in animal feeding are exhausted, the share of “N2O - agricultural
soils” in the total abatement tends to increase and reach 50.4% for a 100 EUR/tCO2 emission tax.
Abatements from manure management (both N2O and CH4) also appear to be more costly as their
share in total abatements stays below their share in the total emissions for the whole t range. Indeed,
the main means of abating emissions from this source lies in the changing of manure management
systems. At this stage, this is not captured by the model as the fraction of manure handled under each
management system is kept constant for each animal category and each farm type. As a consequence,
the only way for farmers to reduce this source of emissions is to reduce animal numbers, which incurs
higher abatement costs9. The relative rigidity of emissions from each source is hence a crucial feature
9Accounting for the adoption by farmers of new manure management systems would incur additional investment and
labor cost that are not considered in the model.
12in the magnitude of estimated abatement costs.
3 Marginal abatement cost heterogeneity
3.1 Regional distribution of abatement costs
Once marginal abatement costs curves are estimated, the next step in our analysis consists in assessing
the spatial distribution of abatement costs. For a given emission tax, marginal abatement costs are
equal across farmers. The heterogeneity of marginal abatement cost curves implies that abatements
diﬀer from one farmer to another.
Abatements for each farm type were computed for an emission tax of 55.8 EUR per ton of CO2eq.
As discussed in section 2, this emission tax leads to a 8%-reduction in total agricultural emissions as
compared to initial emissions. Abatements were then aggregated for each of the 101 FADN regions.
Figure 4 shows the abatement rate (relative to the“Agenda 2000”emissions) for each FADN region in
the EU-15. Regional abatement rates for region R (τR(t)) is thus computed as follows:










R = R1,...,R101 (2)
This map indicates a large variability of the regional relative abatement rates, which range from
almost 0% to 24%. Darker shades on the map signal the regions where the abatement rate relative
to the initial total of regional emissions is higher. Abatement costs in these regions are thus lower,
insofar as farmers can achieve higher relative abatement at a given marginal cost t = 55.8 EUR/tCO2.
<Figure 4 about here>
Obviously, the information provided ﬁgure 4 is not suﬃcient to assess the regional distribution of
the total abatement. The distribution of initial emissions (ER
∗(0)) among regions also matters to that
respect. This additional information is shown on ﬁgure 5.
<Figure 5 about here>
Regions are sorted with respect to increasing τR(55.8) (x axis on ﬁgure 5). Regions with the higher
relative abatement rates are thus located to the right of the chart. Regional relative abatement rates
are then plotted against the cumulative initial emissions for each of the 101 FADN regions considered
in the analysis. The initial regional emissions for each abatement rate depicted on map 4 can therefore
be derived from ﬁgure 5 (squares). For instance, the regions with the lowest abatement rates (ranging
from 0 to 5%) represent approximately 70 MtCO2eq. On the other end of the cumulative curve,
another 70 MtCO2eq corresponds to τR(55.8) higher than 11%. Abatement rates ranging between 5
13and 11% –centered around the 8% EU average reduction– concern the remaining initial emissions or
205 MtCO2eq.
3.2 Infra-regional heterogeneity of abatement costs
Each of the 734 farm types is known to belong to a given FADN region, although it cannot be
precisely located within this region. The distribution of abatement rates at the farm-type level is
also analyzed. Using the same approach as above, the 734 farm-types are sorted out with respect
to increasing individual abatement rates (τk(t) =
ek∗(0)−ek∗(t)
ek∗(0) ). Variability at the farm-type level is
by construction larger than the regional variability. The regional aggregation thus hides some of the
abatement cost variability. Consequently, the farm-type cumulative curve (depicted by triangles in
ﬁgure 5) is less concentrated around the EU abatement rate (8%) and the range of abatement rates is
wider than at the regional level. The infra-regional distribution of abatement rates can be derived from
the diﬀerence between the farm-type and the regional scatter plots. Interestingly, this infra-regional
variability matters the most for the lowest abatement rates. Farm-type with very low abatement rates
(<1%) represent about 20% of the initial emissions. This share drops to less than 2% when abatements
are regionally aggregated. This diﬀerence tends to decrease when approaching the EU-wide average
abatement rate. In terms of marginal abatement costs, this indicates a large infra-regional variance
and a right-skewed distribution.
As the emission tax and the total abatement increase, the distribution of abatements among the
734 farm types changes. Figure 6 shows the changes in the distribution of the individual relative
abatement rates (τk(t)) for t = 20, 55.8, and 100 EUR/tCO2. These emission taxes translate into EU
abatement rates of approximately 4%, 8% and 12%, respectively. Expectedly, the higher the emission
tax, the larger the abatement for all farm types. This implies a rightward shift of the cumulative
curves as t increases. More interestingly, the initial emission for individual abatement rates lower than
the EU average reduction is decreasing with respect to the emission tax. For an emission tax of 20
EUR/tCO2, the farmers who reduce their emissions by less than the EU average abatement (4%) emit
approximately 227 MtCO2eq. This number drops to 207 MtCO2eq for a 55.8 EUR/tCO2 emission
tax (8% average abatement), and to 201 MtCO2eq for a 100 EUR/tCO2 emission tax (12% average
abatement). This suggests a shift in the concentration of abatements as the emission tax increases.
<Figure 6 about here>
143.3 Abatement cost heterogeneity and the potential savings of incentive-based
instruments vs uniform standards
In the previous section, we used an emission tax as a means of estimating the individual and regional
marginal abatement curves. We now turn to the issue of implementing a mitigation policy of GHG
emissions from agriculture. Of course, if control costs were small enough, an emission tax would
be a ﬁrst-best instrument and lead to an optimal allocation of abatement among farmers. If such
an instrument were to be chosen, the ﬁgure 2 and ﬁgure 4 would give an appropriate picture of
the impact on the total level and the regional distribution of emissions. However, as noticed by
Newell and Stavins (2003), conventional standards are often preferred over ﬁrst-best instruments by
policymakers for various policy reasons. The potential savings permitted by ﬁrst-best instruments
relative to conventional standards are thus worth being assessed.
We examine the abatement costs associated with “uniform relative quotas”. That is, we impose
that each farmer has to meet a given reduction target, expressed as a percentage of his/her initial
emissions. This percentage is assumed to be the same for all farmers, say α% of the farm-type initial
emissions. To do so, we introduce a new constraint in each individual farm-type model:
ek ≤ (1 − α).ek∗
(0) (λk
α) (3)
ek∗(0) is the optimal level of emissions for the k-th farm type computed in the “Agenda 2000”
scenario with a 0 EUR emission tax. The shadow price (λk
α) associated with this constraint reﬂects
the marginal abatement cost of achieving this target for the k-th farmer. As the constraint should
be binding at the optimum, λk
α
∗ is strictly positive. As discussed in the previous section, marginal
abatement cost curves have been found to vary widely both at regional and farm-type levels. Con-
sequently, if the imposed abatement rate is constant across farmers, marginal abatement costs are
expected to diﬀer from one farmer to another. Indeed a uniform relative quota distorts the allocation
of abatement. As a result, the total abatement cost is expected to be higher under a uniform relative
quota regime for the same environmental results.
This is examined on table 1. For three abatement rates (α=4%, 8%, and 12%), we compute the
individual marginal abatement costs as the optimal shadow prices (λk
α
∗) associated to the emission
constraint (3). The average of marginal abatement costs – weighted by the share of each farm type in











15As the imposed abatement rate α is the same for all k and constraint (3) is binding for all k, the total
EU abatement rate is therefore also equal to α.
The marginal cost of achieving any given reduction target can be compared for an emission tax
and a uniform relative quota. To meet a 4% reduction target, the average marginal abatement costs
for a uniform relative quota is 3.6 times higher than the marginal abatement costs associated with
the emission tax for the same total abatement. This ratio decreases as the stringency of the quota
increases: meeting a uniform 8% (12%) reduction target is 2.2 (1.7) times more expensive than with
an emission tax. This decrease reﬂects the change in the concentration of abatement costs described
in section 3.2. The eﬃciency loss associated with uniform relative quotas can also be measured in
terms of total abatement at a given carbon price. Going back to ﬁgure 2, a 73.6 EUR/tCO2 emission
tax results in a 10% abatement, more than twice as much as under a uniform quota regime.
Abatement target Total abatement Marginal abatement cost Eﬃciency loss
Emission tax Uniform quotas
α t ¯ λα ¯ λα/t
(%) (MtCO2eq) (EUR t/CO2) (EUR t/CO2)
4% 13.78 20.51 73.64 3.6
8% 27.56 55.84 122.66 2.2
12% 41.35 >100.00 169.62 <1.7
Table 1: Comparison of marginal abatement costs under an emission tax and a uniform relative quota
Concluding remarks
Abatement costs are a fundamental determinant of the role that agriculture could play in meeting
eﬃciently the EU commitment to reduce its GHG emissions. Two broad dimensions have been ex-
amined in this paper: (i) the magnitude of abatement costs in the agricultural sector and (ii) their
heterogeneity.
On the ﬁrst aspect, the estimated aggregate abatement supply curve indicates how much abatement
would result from the implementation of an incentive-based mitigation policy. This curve can be used
in assessing the impacts of either an emission-tax or a tradable-permit system, provided that is based
on the IPCC emission accounting method. One important issue concerns the implementability and
the eﬃciency of IPCC-based economic instruments, especially with regard to the trade-oﬀ between
accuracy and observability. To this respect, this method provides an interesting balance. Of course,
on one hand, complex emission processes are only imperfectly captured because of the use of simpliﬁed
relationships between activities and emissions. On the other hand however, the IPCC framework is
16recognized as an international reference and is based on easily observable data10. This balance is of
great importance in the design of operational and eﬃcient economic instruments.
The approach retained in our analysis is somewhat pragmatical insofar as we focus on the abatement
potential at given carbon prices. In many respects, several of our modeling assumptions are rather
conservative (ﬁxed number of farms, constant total area, no account for carbon sequestration, ﬁxed
manure management systems, etc.). These assumptions lead to marginal abatement costs magnitudes
that lie in the upper-range of what should be expected from agriculture. Moreover, structural drivers –
such as the evolution of the CAP– could also play a major role in the future evolution of GHG emissions
from EU agriculture. However and despite these restrictive assumptions, our results indicate that the
contribution of agriculture to the total EU abatement can be higher in relative terms than in the
rest of the economy. 2001 levels of GHG emissions from agriculture are already about 7.4% lower
than in 1990 (reference year for the Kyoto Protocol). Additional abatements are thus potentially
available from agriculture and may provide an eﬃcient alternative to emission reductions in sectors
where abatement costs are large. Incentives to further reduce GHG emissions from agriculture would
thus contribute to lower the costs of complying with the EU commitments and bridge the gap between
projected total EU emissions and the Kyoto targets. At the same time, this would ﬁt the evolution of
the CAP, whereby environmental concerns are increasingly emphasized in the design of agricultural
policies.
Abatement costs heterogeneity comes from a variety of sources. The regional variability –partly
embedded in the FADN database– is well captured by the model for some of these sources, such as
those related to farms’ size, crop yields and area allocation, total animal numbers, input use, CAP
support. Some are captured only at the country-level (emission factors). And, due to the lack of data,
some of the sources of heterogeneity have been ignored, mostly at the infra-regional level. However, the
estimated heterogeneity of abatement costs is shown to be large. This has two broad implications for
policy purposes. First, the impacts of incentive-based instruments impact income and environmental
performances vary widely from one farmer to another. Second, the eﬃciency loss associated with
uniform relative quotas is substantial.
If for some reason, quotas are still preferred by policymakers, it is thus worth considering dif-
ferentiated ones. The optimal level at which these standards should be set –EU-wide, country-wide,
regional, infra-regional, or individual– needs to be further investigated. Further research is also needed
in order to relax some of our modeling assumptions. For instance, the introduction of more ﬂexible
10Most of this information –such as area, animal numbers, purchased animal feeding– is already collected for CAP-
support related purposes. Arguably however some important emission-driving activities, such as on-farm consumption
of animal feeding, are more diﬃcult to control.
17yield responses to nitrogen inputs would contribute to lower the estimated abatement costs for N2O
emissions. So would do endogenous choices of manure management systems. Finally, the inclusion of
carbon sinks in agricultural is essential for future research, as it would provide farmers with alternative
ways of reducing their net emissions.
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20Figure 1: IPCC emissions as reported in the 2003 national communications (years 1997 and 2001) vs model computations
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Kyoto 8%-reduction requirement for agriculture and a 8% reduction of 2001 model emissions
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Figure 4: Spatial heterogeneity of regional abatement rates (“Agenda 2000” scenario, t=55.8 EUR/tCO2eq, EU abatement rate
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Tax on emissions = 55.84 EUR/tCO2eq; EU abatement 
rate= 8%
Figure 5: Regional (squares) and farm-type (triangles) relative abatement rates vs cumulative initial emissions (“Agenda 2000”
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Figure 6: Scatter plots of farm-type relative abatement rates vs cumulative initial emissions for three emission taxes (“Agenda
2000” scenario)
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6A Appendix: Emission accounting: Description of the IPCC method-
ology
A.1 Nitrous oxide emissions from agricultural soils
These emissions are primarily due to the microbial process of nitriﬁcation and denitriﬁcation in the soil.
Three categories of emissions are distinguished by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2001b): direct soil emissions (EAD
N2O), indirect soil emissions (EAI
N2O), and emissions induced by grazing
animals (EM
N2O).
Equations used in the calculation of N2O direct emissions rely on a simple representation of the
nitrogen cycle in agricultural soils. N2O is a gaseous intermediate in the reaction sequence of aerobic
microbial oxidation of ammonium to nitrate (nitriﬁcation) and anaerobic microbial reduction of ni-
trate to di-nitrogen gas (denitriﬁcation). Surveys from ﬁeld experiments have shown that an increase
of nitrogen availability in soils results in an increase of nitriﬁcation and denitriﬁcation rates, and
consequently in higher N2O emissions.
Generally speaking, the computation of direct N2O emissions consists in collecting the amount
of nitrogen inputs to soils (converted into N2O equivalent11) and multiplying them by appropriate
emission factors that reﬂect the percentage of the nitrogen input transformed into N2O (denoted
hereafter by EF). A detailed description of all equations used in this category can be found in
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001b, pp 4.54–4.70).
The total nitrogen input are computed for (i) synthetic fertilizer use (
P
j∈J NSj.Sj, NSj being the
per-hectare nitrogen input and Sj the area planted in crop j), (ii) animal waste applied to soils as
fertilizer (
P
i∈I Ai.NMi, where Ai is the number of animal in the ith animal category and NMi the
annual per-head amount of nitrogen produced by animal i), (iii) nitrogen ﬁxation by N-ﬁxing crops
(NF j, J0 being the subset of N-ﬁxing crops in the set of crops J) and (iv) nitrogen content of crop
residues (NRj). The total amount of nitrogen input is corrected to account for the fraction of nitrogen



























Manure and synthetic fertilizer inputs also contribute to indirect N2O emissions according to two
diﬀerent processes: (i) volatilization and subsequent atmospheric deposition of NH3 and NOx, and (ii)
nitrogen leaching and run-oﬀ. The percentage of nitrogen that volatilizes as NOx and NH3 is taken
as constant in the IPCC guidelines. So is the percentage of nitrogen lost through leaching and run-oﬀ
(γL
S and γL
M). It leads to the following equation for this category:
EAI

























11The conversion factor between N and N2O is 44/28.
27The last source of N2O emissions from agricultural soils is the nitrogen content of grazing livestock
excrements that are directly deposited on soils. This requires to know the percentage of manure







A.2 Nitrous oxide emissions from manure management
N2O emissions from manure management (EM
N2O) occur during the storage and treatment of manure.
That is, this category covers N2O emissions before manure is applied to land as fertilizer and excludes
unmanaged manure (deposited on soils by grazing animals, see above). The IPCC method uses the
average nitrogen excretion rates from each animal category (NMi), as well as the percentage of manure
for each animal category handled under each manure management system (αi,s). Each management
system is assigned an emission factor (EFM










where S is the set of manure management systems.
A.3 Methane emissions from manure management
The decomposition of organic material contained in livestock manure in an anaerobic environment
produces methane through the action of methanogenic bacteria. This occurs generally when large
numbers of animals are managed in conﬁned areas. IPCC method to compute CH4 emissions from
manure (EM








where δi represents the maximum CH4 producing capacities for animal i, V Si represents the annual
volatile excretion rate for animal i and ηs is the CH4 conversion factor for each manure management
system. V Si depends on the energy content of feed intake and feed digestibility.
A.4 Methane emissions from enteric fermentation
Methane is also produced in large quantities during the digestive process of animals. Highest emissions
occur for ruminant animals because of a signiﬁcant amount of methane-producing fermentation in the
rumen. Total emissions from enteric fermentation can be derived from the energy content of feed
intake that is lost as methane (χCH4 is the energy content of methane). IPCC recommends to derive









28A.5 CH4 emissions from rice ﬁelds
Anaerobic decomposition of organic material in ﬂooded rice ﬁelds produces CH4. This is a relatively
minor source of CH4 for the EU, which only concerns Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece,
France). The annual amount of CH4 from rice cultivation (ER
CH4) can be derived as a constant methane
ﬂow per hectare (EFR




Emission sources Activity data Linked to
N2O Agricultural soils
Direct Emissions
Use of synthetic fertilizers N fertilizer application Crop area
Manure application N excretion by animals Animal number
Biological N ﬁxation Production of N-ﬁxing crops N-ﬁxing crop area
Crop residues Reutilization of crop residues Crop area
Animal production N excretion by grazing animals Animal number
Indirect Emissions
Atmospheric deposition Total N application Crop area and animal number
Leaching and run-oﬀ Total N application Crop area and animal number
N2O Manure management Animal number
CH4 Manure management
Dairy Cattle Feed energy content Animal feeding
Non-dairy cattle Feed energy content Animal feeding
Sheep Feed energy content Animal feeding
Goats Feed energy content Animal feeding
Swine Feed energy content Animal feeding
Poultry Feed energy content Animal feeding
CH4 Enteric fermentation
Dairy Cattle Feed energy content Animal feeding
Non-dairy cattle Feed energy content Animal feeding
Sheep Feed energy content Animal feeding
Goats Feed energy content Animal feeding
Swine Feed energy content Animal feeding
Poultry Feed energy content Animal feeding
CH4 Rice cultivation Rice area Rice area
Table 2: Summary of GHG emission sources accounted for in the model
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